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VI. ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
VII. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR GRAND JURY To INDICT
VIII. COMPETENCY OF JUROR
IX. FEDERAL COURT CASES
I. PRESUMPTIONS
The difficulty in dealing with presumptions arises in part from
the fact that the term embraces a host of different meanings, varying
with the purposes underlying the presumption in a given situation.
Unfortunately, the courts seldom articulate the meaning which they
are attributing to the term and consequently do little to clear up the
confusion. Three cases in which the term was used during the
survey period illustrate the point.
Kernodle v. Peerless Life Insurance Co.' presented the recurring
question of the effect of the presumption against suicide. The de-
ceased had taken out an insurance policy providing for benefits for
accidental death resulting from injuries received "while the insured
is riding as a fare-paying passenger within the enclosed part of a
railway passenger car." The policy was taken out twenty-six days
prior to the death, caused by a fall from the enclosed loading plat-
form of a moving passenger train, the doors of which "required
considerable strength" to open. The court reviewed the evidence,
which contained "no positive proof" of death by accident or by a
deliberate act. In applying the presumption against suicide, the court,
relying on prior cases, said that,
where a death by external and violent means is shown, and there is no proof
as to how it is caused, or the attendant circumstances leave the question
doubtful, or the proof concerning them is conflicting or not inconsistent with
accident, the law presumes accidental death, and the burden of proof, in its
Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 213 Tenn. 631, 378 S.W.2d 744 (1964).
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secondary sense, is cast on the defendant ... to prove by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence that death was caused by suicide.2
Further, the court held that in such circumstances, the presumption
against suicide "comes to the aid of complainant in making out a
case of accidental death."
In Arnett v. Fuston,3 a negligence action, plaintiff argued that a
verdict of not guilty against one of the two co-defendants was not
supported by any evidence, and that a presumption should apply
against him "for his election to stand on his motion for directed
verdict and his failure to offer any evidence," because the facts of
the accident were peculiarly within his knowledge and 'is silence
gives rise to the presumption that his testimony, if given, would be
contrary to his contention in his plea of not guilty."4
In rejecting this contention, the court made three points: (1) Negli-
gence is never presumed from the mere happening of an accident,
but must be proved; (2) where two different conclusions might
reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, the questions of negli-
gence and ordinary care are for the jury; and (3) the rule of adverse
presumption relied on by plaintiff is not to be taken as substantive
proof and never relieves the party with the burden of proof from
making out a prima facie case.
The plaintiff in the Arnett case was apparently arguing on appeal
that the presumption of which he spoke should have been taken into
account by the appellate court in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict. In Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wilson,5 an action on a fire insurance policy for loss of household
furniture, the appellate court apparently did just that. The principle
question in the case was whether the defendant company had notice
of a move from the premises described in the policy to another city,
and thence to a house outside the other city's limits. The court
affirmed a judgment for plaintiff, and in so doing, said that if the
agent, or the company through the agent, knew the facts, and the
company with its agent in the courtroom offered no proof, and did
not put the agent on the stand, "the presumption would be that if
he had testified his evidence would have supported that of the
plaintiffs."
In Southern Coal & Coke Co. v. Beech Grove Mining Co.,7 the court
said:
2. Id. at 638, 378 S.W.2d at 747.
3. 378 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1964).
4. Id. at 428.
5. 383 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964).
6. Id. at 799.
7. 381 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
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It is a well-settled rule of law in this state that 'where it is apparent that
a party has the power to produce evidence of a more explicit, direct, and
satisfactory character than that which he does introduce and relies on, it may
be presumed that if the more satisfactory evidence had been given it would
have been detrimental to him and would have laid open deficiencies in and
objections to, his case, which the more obscure and uncertain evidence did
not disclose.'8
II. CIRcuMsTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Monts v. State9 resulted in a conviction of three defendants for
murder, and two of the defendants appealed. One of the principal
errors alleged was the failure of the trial court to charge on circum-
stantial evidence. The rule in Tennessee is that when the only evi-
dence connecting a defendant with the commission of a crime is
circumstantial, the trial court must instruct the jury on circumstantial
evidence, regardless of whether the defendant requests the charge.
However, when the evidence is both circumstantial and direct, the
failure of the trial court to give a charge on circumstantial evidence is
not reversible error, unless the defendant requests the charge.
In the Monts case, the evidence was both circumstantial and direct,
the direct evidence being a confession. In such a case, the court
reasoned that it is entirely possible that the jury, in determining the
credibility of the evidence, might reject the direct evidence and rely
entirely on the circumstantial evidence. "But without the law of
circumstantial evidence before them, how can they be expected to
properly evaluate this evidence?" 10 The court then conceded that
under this rationale, logically the charge on circumstantial evidence
should be given whenever circumstantial evidence is present. How-
ever, the court felt that the mandatory provisions of section 40-2517
of the Tennessee Code prevented a change in the established rule.
That statute provides that if attorneys desire further instructions,
they must request them. Although the provisions of the statute are
mandatory, they are not mandatory "where the omitted charge con-
cerns fundamental defenses." The subject matter of a circumstantial
evidence charge is not fundamental where the state's case consists of
both circumstantial and direct evidence.
One is tempted to use Wigmore's phrase, "a wondrous cobweb of
pedantry," in describing the court's opinion on this point, particularly
since the technicality of the approach led the court to reverse the
conviction of the defendant who had requested a charge on circum-
stantial evidence, but to affirm as to the defendant who did not so
8. Id. at 302.
9. 379 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1964).
10. Id. at 41.
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request. Since both defendants must have been convicted on the same
evidence, having been tried together, and since both defendants
were sentenced to death, the occasion seems to have been particularly
inappropriate for such technical reasoning as the court displayed.
It should be pointed out, however, that on the second petition to
rehear, the court was convinced that the defendant in question did
make the request, and reversed the conviction on that ground.
One type of circumstantial evidence the Tennessee courts exclude
is the result of a lie detector test. In Grant v. State," defendant,
charged with subornation of perjury, sought to introduce evidence in
regard to a polygraph test he had taken. The court said its exclusion
was not error. "The results of a polygraph test are inadmissible in
evidence and this would include the circumstances surrounding the
taking or not taking of such test by a defendant." 2
A. Opinion Evidence
Opinion evidence is a form of circumstantial evidence, which is
generally excluded under the opinion rule. The opinion rule is, in
fact, two rules, one relating to the opinions of laymen, the other to
the opinions of experts. Two cases during the survey period dealt
with expert opinions.
Murray v. State, 3 was a prosecution for incest. Part of the evidence
was the fact of the birth of a deformed child to defendant's sixteen-
year-old daughter. The evidence objected to was testimony by a
physician in attendance when the short-lived child was born, that
"an incestuous union would be one of the causes of deformity borne
by a sixteen year old mother."
Although the doctor testified further that he had eliminated all
other known causes for the deformity and that it was his opinion
that an incestuous union was the cause of the deformity, the court's
opinion was concerned with his testimony as quoted above. The
court said "it is always permissible to permit a qualified expert to
state a conclusion or give an opinion on a subject on which the trial
court and the jury need the help of expert opinion."14
To the defendant's contention that the evidence was highly specula-
tive, the court said such testimony is always more or less speculative,
but it is not inadmissible for that reason. The opinion was relevant
"because it was circumstantial evidence which tended to show that
the prosecutrix had entered into an incestuous relationship."15
11. 213 Tenn. 440, 374 S.W.2d 391 (1964).
12. Id. at 443, 374 S.W.2d at 392.
13. 377 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn. 1964).
14. Id. at 919.
15. Id. at 920.
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In a workmen's compensation case, Magnavox Co. v. Shepherd,16
claimant was awarded increased compensation due to increase
of incapacity from the original injury. In determining on appeal
that there was no evidence to support the award, the court said the
claimant and her husband were not competent to testify that the
increase in incapacity "'was due solely to her injury."' The question
was one for a doctor. The testimony of the physician in the case was
to the effect that his opinion was that the change was not due to the
original injury, and that of the present complaint. The court said
if the doctor, as a competent medical authority, so testifies, "then the
testimony of lay witnesses to the contrary would be of no probative
value. At best, such evidence would be considered merely speculative
and the testimony of the doctor would have to be accepted over that
of the lay witnesses under these circumstances. Any other holding
would deny the probative force of men learned in a profession and
give way to the testimony of those totally unfamiliar with the human
body and the many complexities therein." 7
B. Corroborating Testimony
Corroborating testimony is another category of evidence which is
usually circumstantial. In two cases during the survey period, State
v. Fowler 8 and Boulton v. State,19 the primary question involved was
the sufficiency of evidence to corroborate an accomplice's testimony.
In the Fowler case, two defendants were convicted of larceny, largely
upon the testimony of two witnesses who had confessed and pleaded
guilty to the same charge. On appeal, the defendants alleged that
the state failed to corroborate the accomplice's testimony.
The state introduced evidence that on the night of the crime,
larceny of a safe from a store, both defendants were seen talking with
both witnesses; that the station wagon of one of the defendants was
seen near the scene of the burglary on the night in question; that
four unidentified men went behind the telephone company and drove
away in a truck which the defendants were charged with stealing;
and that the ashes of burned paper were found on the farm of one
of the defendants where the accomplice's witnesses said the group had
burned the papers from the safe, after dividing the money. The
state also showed that when defendants were confronted by the
implicating statements of the accomplices, "they hung their heads and
made no audible responses." The court, without so stating, strongly
implied that this admission by silence was corroborating evidence.
16. 379 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. 1964).
17. Id. at 793.
18. 213 Tenn. 239, 373 S.W.2d 460 (1963).
19. 377 S.W.2d 936 (Tenn. 1964).
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The rule applied was that the testimony of an accomplice requires
corroboration, and "there should be some fact testified to entirely
independent of the accomplice's testimony, which, taken by itself,
leads to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but
that the defendant is implicated in it, and the corroboration must
consist of some fact that affects the identity of the party accused."2°
The court concluded that even though "slight circumstances may be
sufficient to furnish the necessary corroboration of an accomplice," the
circumstances in the present cases, in addition to the proven facts, were
more than slight.
In the Boulton case, applying the same rule as in the Fowler case,
the court found that the testimony of the accomplice was not cor-
roborated. The defendant was indicted "with a crime against nature
by engaging in fellatio with a 14-year-old-boy," and found "'guilty of
an attempt to commit a felony."' The only direct evidence was the
story of the boy, who was an accomplice. The evidence relied on
to corroborate that of the accomplice was the testimony of the boy's
married sister. Her testimony was that the defendant had been the
boy's grade school teacher, had taken the boy, with others, on
swimming parties, that once or twice he took the boy and the boy's
brother to a Christmas parade in Nashville, and that once he bad
expressed to the boy's mother affection for the boy.
The court said, "evidence which merely casts a suspicion on the
accused or only shows he had an opportunity to commit the crime, is
legally insufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice."21
The state also invoked the rule of admission by silence, on the basis
of testimony by the sister that when confronted with the charges,
the defendant burst into tears and asked the boy, "'Why did you
do this to me?"' The witness testified that defendant did not deny
the charge, but on cross-examination, she said she did not remember
hearing the defendant ask, "'Why don't you tell the truth?"'
The court said that the conduct of the accused could not be
construed as silence or acquiescence in the truth of the charge. "It is
recognized in all our cases that this rule of admission by silence 'should
be applied with circumspection."'
III. BEST EVIDENCE
In Gamble v. State, 2 three defendants, members of the Memphis
Police Department at the time of the crime alleged in the indictment,
were convicted of grand larceny. Part of the state's evidence consisted
20. 213 Tenn. 239, 245, 373 S.W.2d 460, 463 (1963).
21. 377 S.W.2d at 939.
22. 383 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1964).
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of police radio logs, in which entries were made at the time of the
broadcasts, which broadcasts were also recorded on tape. The de-
fendants contended that the tape recordings were best evidence.
The court, in rejecting this contention, said the radio logs were
original records made in the regular course of the business of the
police department at the time of the event and were admissible under
the provisions of code sections 24-712 through 24-715. The court
also pointed out that at no time did defendants obtain a subpoena
duces tecum and seek to introduce the tapes in evidence at the trial.
IV. ADMISSIONS
Holley v. Taylor2 presented an interesting factual situation con-
cerning admissions. The action, by plaintiff-sister against defendant-
sister, driver, and other parties who did not appeal, was for injuries
resulting from an automobile accident. Plaintiff had given a deposition
and also testified at the trial. The defendant alleged error by the trial
court in refusing her a directed verdict, on the grounds that plaintiffs
testimony on cross-examination negatived each and every allegation
of negligence. The defendant also introduced certain evidence from
the discovery deposition of plaintiff as admissions, which was even
more inconsistent with the allegations of negligence than was the
testimony at the trial.
The court quoted at length from the plaintiff's testimony at the
trial and concluded that it was "not completely inconsistent with all
of the allegations of negligence in her declaration." Admitting that
the testimony from the deposition was "more inconsistent with the
allegations" of negligence, the court said, "It was within the province
of the jury to decide which, if either, version of plaintiff's testimony
it would believe," and affirmed the judgment.
Gay & Taylor, Inc. v. American Casualty Co.24 was an action by
an insurance company against an independent adjusting firm for
breach of contract. The defendant had failed to forward to plaintiff's
attorneys a claim file, and default judgments were rendered against
plaintiff's insured. The plaintiff had to prove that its insured had a
meritorious defense to the suits in which default judgments were
rendered, and the only evidence in the record describing the accident
involved was a statement by the insured's driver. Although the court
did not so term it, the statement constituted an admission, and
largely on the basis of this evidence, the court concluded that there
was no meritorious defense to the suits in question. However, the
court did award plaintiff nominal damages for breach of contract.
23. 381 S.W.2d 510 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1964).




It is the accepted rule in Tennessee that prior inconsistent state-
ments admitted for the purpose of impeachment are not to be con-
sidered as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter contained
in the statement. Such statements are to be considered only for
the purpose of testing the witness's credibility. McFarlin v. State,2
presented an interesting trial situation in which two witnesses for
the state surprised the prosecutor by giving testimony contradictory
to their prior written statements. The witnesses admitted having
made the statements, but denied that they were correct. Later, the
witnesses were recalled and testified that, contrary to their previous
testimony, the matters stated in their extra-judicial statements were
true.
The defendant alleged on appeal that the only evidence in the
record showing him to be guilty of the charges, contributing to
the delinquency of the two minor female witnesses, was the statements
made prior to the trial. The court, rejecting the contention that
the prior inconsistent statements could not be considered as sub-
stantive evidence, said that the main argument against the admission
of extra-judicial declarations is that they are hearsay, subject to
hearsay dangers.
However, when the impeached witness, after denying the truth of such a
prior statement, is recalled and corrects his testimony so as to affirm the
truth of it, his statement then is not hearsay because it is now made under
oath, in the presence of defendant, and before the court, and subject to
cross-examination to test his credibility; and it is then to be considered by
the jury as part of the total testimony of the witness.26
Both the reasoning and the result of the case are sound, since the
witness, in effect, gave their extra-judicial statements under oath. Had
the witnesses not recanted and affirmed the correctness of their
extra-judicial statements, the orthodox rule would have limited the
use of the statements for purposes of impeachment and precluded
their use as substantive evidence. On this point, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently qualified the
orthodox rule in a case which may have far reaching consequences
and which, for that reason, deserves a brief discussion here. The case
was United States v. DeSisto2 7 in which a witness on direct examina-
tion identified the defendant as the man who had hi-jacked his truck.
On cross-examination, the witness recanted and expressed doubt as
25. 381 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. 1964).
26. Id. at 924.
27. 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964).
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to the identification. On re-direct, the witness admitted having
several times identified the defendant, at FBI headquarters, before a
grand jury, and at the first trial of the defendant. However, he
continued to express doubt at the second trial. The defendant's
counsel sought an instruction during the Government's presentation
that the prior identifications could be considered only as bearing
on the witness' present credibility and not as substantive evidence.
The trial judge gave a general instruction several days later that
an inconsistent statement by a witness "'made prior to trial, not made
under oath, is not to be considered as affirmative proof on the issue
but only brought before you as impeaching testimony."' The ap-
pellate court assumed arguendo that the charge did not correct the
claimed error.
The court said that the prior identification could be used as
substantive evidence in what appears to be the first instance of such
a holding. To what extent the holding will in the future be limited
to the facts of the case or to what extent it may presage a more
reasoned application of rules such as the one in question are matters
to be determined. The case, however, is well worth the attention
of Tennessee lawyers and judges.
In Payne v. State,28 the state called a rebuttal witness to impeach
one of defendant's witnesses. The impeaching witness stated he
would not believe the defendant's witness under oath. On cross-
examination, the impeaching witness refused to answer a question as
to the source of his knowledge, and the trial court rejected defendant's
request that the witness be required to answer.
The supreme court, admitting that "there is no decision in this
State exactly in point," reversed for failure to permit the cross-
examination. The court said that the general principle is that every
witness may be discredited by showing the inadequacy of the
sources of his knowledge by cross-examination. "If an impeaching
witness to another's bad reputation is speaking from a well-founded
knowledge of such reputation, he ought to be able to specify some
of the rumored misconduct or some of the individual opinions that
have gone to form that reputation."29
In State v. Fowler,30 the defendant alleged error because the
prosecutor asked him on cross-examination about his gambling activ-
ities, unrelated to the crime of larceny, with which he was charged.
The court simply stated that while proof of other independent crimes
is inadmissible, when the defendant takes the stand as a witness, he
is subject to cross-examination as any other witness. "[F]or the
28. 379 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. 1964).
29. Id. at 762.
30. Supra note 18.
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purpose of affecting his credibility, he may be asked as to specific
acts which involve moral turpitude or any other conduct which tends
to show his lack of veracity or untrustworthiness."31
VI. ILLEGAL SEARCH AM SEIZUPX
Several cases during the survey period raised the problem of
illegal search and seizure. In Shafer v. State,2 the four defendants
were found guilty of carrying burglarious instruments, and one was
found guilty of carrying a pistol with intent to go armed. Each of
the defendants raised the question of unreasonable search and seizure
at the outset of the trial. The jury was excused while the trial judge
heard proof and arguments as to the legality of the search. He
concluded that the search and seizure made at the time of the
arrest of defendants Shafer and Sterger was lawful, and that the
search and seizure made of defendants Newman and Carson was not
incident to a lawful arrest.
The evidence as to the search and seizure made in connection
with Shafer and Sterger was in direct conflict, the police officers giving
one version, the defendants another. The court, quoting from various
cases, said that what is a reasonable search cannot be determined
by a fixed formula, but that each case must be based on its own
facts. The crucial question in this case was whether the defendants
had waived their rights and consented to the search. The appellate
court relied on the fact that the trial judge and the jury found the
story of the arresting officers to be true. Thus, the credibility of the
witnesses had been determined.
The defendants further alleged error in the failure of the trial court
to charge that if the jury found that the arresting officers entered the
quarters, a motel room, under the color of office, the entry was
granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding
and waiver of a constitutional right. The court said that no witness
had testified that Shafer granted permission to enter the room in
submission to authority pursuant to a demand made by the officers.
The defendants also alleged that the issue of the legality of the
search was to be made by the court, not the jury, relying on the fact
that the trial judge had permitted the jury to consider the evidence on
the search in order to make their own determination. The court said
that the rule as to legality of search is the same as that applied
to confessions, and that Tennessee follows the orthodox rule, i.e.,
the judge rules on the voluntariness for purposes of admissibility,
31. Id. at 253, 373 S.W.2d at 466.
32. 381 S.W.2d 254 (Tenn. 1964).
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and the jury considers voluntariness as affecting weight or credibility
of the confession. The fact that the trial judge went further and
applied the "Massachusetts or Humane Rule," allowing the jury
to make its own independent determination was not error. "The
defendants could not possibly be harmed by having the jury in addi-
tion to the Trial Judge pass upon the legality of the search in this
case."3
3
After arrest and search and seizure made in connection with de-
fendants Shafer and Sterger, police officers set up a watch in the
motel room. When defendant Newman knocked on the door, the
officers arrested him, and then arrested defendant Cason, who had
remained seated in his automobile in which the two men had
arrived. The two defendants and the automobile were searched. The
trial judge ruled that this search was not incident to a legal arrest,
and the evidence obtained thereby was incompetent. The appellate
court affirmed.
In Warden v. State,4 defendant was convicted of unlawful pos-
session of intoxicating liquor. He had been searched and arrested by
officers when he appeared at a house which the officers were search-
ing under a search warrant. The officers testified that after seeing a
liquor bottle on defendant's person, they searched him and found
two pints of whiskey and one pint of vodka, and then arrested him.
The court held that a public offense was being committed in the
presence and sight of the officers. They were thus authorized to
arrest, and as an incident to the arrest, were authorized to search him.
The fact that the search preceded the arrest made no difference,
as the search and arrest were at the same time and as such part of
the same transaction.
In Fox v. State,35 two defendants, Fox and Thomerson, were con-
victed of burglary for taking coins from public telephones. Both
defendants were lawfully arrested without a warrant, as the officer
had reasonable cause to believe the defendants had committed or
were about to commit a felony. Subsequent to the arrest, officers told
Fox they had a search warrant for his car and searched it, obtaining
evidence used in the case. On appeal, the defendants questioned the
validity of the search of the automobile, the state attempting to
sustain the search as incident to a lawful arrest.
The court held the search to be illegal, because it "was not con-
ducted at the time of the arrest but at a later hour and in another
place." The court also rejected the state's contention that Fox had
33. Id. at 261.
34. 379 S.W.2d 788 (Tenn. 1964).
35. 383 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. 1964).
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given his consent to have the car searched. The circumstances of
the case, showing that Fox had been at all times after the arrest
under the control of the police, and that the officers told him they
had a warrant suggested "an act of necessity rather than volition."
Even though the evidence seized was inadmissible against Fox, it
was admissible against Thomerson. The automobile, at the time of
seizure and search, was owned by and in possession of Fox, and the
protection extended by the Constitution against illegal search and
seizure did not inure to the benefit of Thomerson.
In Larkins v. State,36 the court reversed the conviction of three
defendants for burglary and grand larceny because of illegal search
and seizure. A search warrant was issued on December 8, 1962, but
the supporting affidavit recited that the information on which the
warrant was issued was received on December 11, 1962. After the
search, all three defendants and the wife of one of them were arrested
and placed in jail. On December 12, 1962, while the defendants were
still in jail, another search warrant for the same premises was issued.
The court held that the search on December 8, 1962, violated the
constitutional rights of the defendants, and any evidence obtained
thereby should have been excluded. The court further found that the
arrest and detention of defendants on December 8th was unlawful
and that the subsequent issuance of a valid search warrant did not
have the effect of legalizing the arrest and did not justify the introduc-
tion of evidence discovered as the result of the second search. The
search of December 12th was a continuation of the search of Decem-
ber 8th and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
Two of the defendants signed confessions, but the third denied his
participation, and without the confessions, there was no competent
evidence to convict him of the crime. The court did not discuss these
confessions further, but did discuss two statements by the wife of
one of the three defendants. The wife repudiated the statements
in court, and the reason she gave for making them was to be with
her baby. The court found that the statements were not given freely
and voluntarily and were inadmissible.
The court concluded by saying that, "strong evidence of guilt will
not justify our affirming these convictions where the record reveals
that the constitutional rights of the Defendants were violated in
obtaining evidence."
37
In State v. Sircy,38 the state appealed from a judgment of the trial
court sustaining a motion of defendant charged with possession of
36. 213 Tenn. 520, 376 S.W.2d 459 (1964).
37. Id. at 531, 376 S.W.2d at 464.
38. 383 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. 1964).
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burglarious instruments to suppress evidence. The evidence, lock
picks, was obtained by a search of defendant's automobile, which
was parked in the driveway of a house for which officers had obtained
a search warrant. The warrant was to search for narcotics at the
premises of named individuals, "including any out-house, or vehicle
found upon or in said premises." The defendant was not named in
the warrant and was not in any way connected with the narcotics
or stolen merchandise. The court found that defendant was a
"'stranger to the process,"' and that the search of his automobile was
illegal. The motion to suppress the evidence was affirmed.
VII. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR GRAN-D JURY To INnIcr
In Burton v. State,39 a prosecution for burglary and larceny, the
defendants alleged error in the refusal of the trial court to allow
cross-examination of the only witness to appear before the grand jury
to show that substantial portions of his testimony were hearsay.
The court discussed the problem at length, but avoided ruling directly
on the question of whether an indictment can properly be based on
hearsay. The opinion cited the United States Supreme Court case
of Costello v. United States O for the proposition that the Constitu-
tion does not prescribe the kind of evidence upon which grand
juries must act, and cited as the majority rule the proposition that the
court will not inquire into the legality or the sufficiency of the
evidence on which an indictment is based. Even so, the court said
that the witness in question "testified when the case was heard on its
merits and demonstrated that he, of his own knowledge, knew ample
facts to establish the offenses. The assignment of error relating
to the character of evidence heard by the Grand Jury are overruled."
Thus, the court appears to have left open in Tennessee the question
of whether hearsay alone is sufficient on which to base an indictment.
VIII. CO METENCY OF JUROR
In Treece v. Hamilton,41 a tort action, the defendants alleged they
were denied a fair trial because of the incompetency of one juror.
On voir dire examination, the jurors were asked if any of their families
had ever been involved in a serious automobile accident. After the
trial, it was learned that the husband of one of the jurors was killed
in an automobile accident, although she had not mentioned this fact.
On examination at a motion for a new trial, the juror explained that
39. 377 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1964).
40. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
41. 378 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
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she understood the question as meaning whether such a fact would
cause one to be prejudiced, "but his death would in no way make
me lean to one side or the other."
The court discussed the rules pertaining to objections to jurors
propter defectum and propter affectum. The former objections go to
the man himself and "are based on general disqualifications such as
age, residence, relationship, feeble mindedness and the like." All
such objections are waived unless made before the jurors are sworn,
regardless of knowledge of the ground for objection. The latter
objections go to bias or partiality, and when the constitutional right
to trial before an impartial jury is invaded, "the challenge must be
heeded even though not made until after verdict."
The court concluded that the juror in question was not prejudiced
and that defendants were not denied a fair and impartial trial by
reason of her presence on the jury.
IX. FmmiAL COURT CASES
United States v. Northern 2 presented an unusual example of cir-
cumstantial evidence. The defendant, convicted of wilfully attempt-
ing to evade a portion of income taxes due for 1956, maintained coin-
operated machines in various places of business. The Government
contended that he did not report in his income tax return collections
from machines at a number of locations. The allegations were that
in 1956, defendant made an agreement with a location owner, Estes,
under which defendant's employee, Green, falsified collection tickets
to show only one-half of the actual moneys collected from the
machines. The defendant and Estes then divided the undisclosed half
and neither reported the money in their tax returns. In 1956, Estes
discontinued the use of defendant's machines and Green left de-
fendant's employ. The evidence objected to was that in 1957, sub-
sequent to the indictment years, defendant's machines were re-estab-
lished in Estes' place of business; defendant personally made the
collections from these machines, writing on the collection tickets
only one half of the moneys collected and dividing the other half with
Estes, all without any discussion of the subject by defendant with
Estes.
The evidence was admitted solely to show defendant's knowledge
of the prior practice in the indictment years. The court said the
evidence tended to prove knowledge and authorization by defendant
of the concealments which took place in the tax years in question,
and, "We think this testimony was admissible."
42. 329 F.2d 794 (6th Cir. 1964).
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In Dixon v. Serodino,3 the action was to recover for the death of
plaintiff's seaman husband under the Jones Act. The plaintiff widow
testified "to receiving support from her husband, whom she described
as a steady worker and good provider." In October, 1960, prior to the
fatal accident in June, 1951, the plaintiff had filed a petition for
divorce. Her complaint charged that her husband would not support
her, that he stayed in an intoxicated condition, and that she had to
work to support herself. The admission of the allegations of the
divorce complaint was not error. The court said only that the allega-
tions of the divorce complaint strongly contradicted plaintiffs testi-
mony on the issue of support without further analyzing the evidence.
Powers v. J. B. Michael & Co." was an action for injuries sustained
in an automobile accident against a highway contractor who was
widening highway 64 under a contract with the state. The collision
occurred on a portion of the highway not included in the contract,
and the question was whether defendant was under any duty to do
anything about the danger to motorists because of the narrowing of
the highway. Plaintiff introduced evidence of prior accidents at
approaches to other bridges on highway 64 for the purpose of showing
that defendant had notice of danger at the point in question. The
appellate court held the evidence admissible. "[T]he applicable
Tennessee decisions do not require exact proof of identity of condi-
tions in order to render the evidence of prior accidents admissible
on the question of notice."45
The plaintiff also introduced evidence that defendant subsequent
to the accident placed on the premises some danger signs and
smudge pots. The trial court cautioned the jury that the evidence
was not admissible as proof of original negligence by defendant, but
was "admissible only as it tended to prove that this part of the
highway was under the control of the defendant." The appellate
court said, "It is true that the possible prejudicial effect of such
evidence remains in the case, but certainly it is a matter of discretion
for the trial judge to admit this evidence for this limited purpose, and
again we perceive no abuse of discretion."46
43. 331 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1964).
44. 329 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1964).
45. Id. at 677.
46. Ibid.
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